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Abstract: We investigate the degree to which people in a shopping mall express other-regarding 
behavior in the dictator game. Whereas many studies have attempted to increase the social 
distance between the dictator and experimenter and between the dictator and dictatee, we attempt 
to minimize that social distance between random strangers by video recording the decisions with 
the permission of the dictators to display their image on the Internet. Offers made by dictators 
are high relative to other experiments and a nontrivial number give the entire experimental 
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Abstract: We investigate the degree to which people in a shopping mall express other-regarding 
behavior in the dictator game.  Whereas many studies have attempted to increase the social 
distance between the dictator and experimenter and between the dictator and dictatee, we attempt 
to minimize that social distance between random strangers by video recording the decisions with 
the permission of the dictators to display their image on the Internet.  Offers made by dictators 
are high relative to other experiments and a nontrivial number give the entire experimental 
windfall away, however a nontrivial number of people keep everything as well.  
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I. Introduction 
 One of the most commonly conducted laboratory experiments is the dictator game, a 
strategically simple game in which Player A divides some amount of money between himself 
and another player. The dictator game was originally conceived as a variation of the ultimatum 
game, in which Player A proposes a split of money that Player B can either accept or reject. In 
the ultimatum game, Player A has strategic reasons to offer some amount of money to Player B, 
to ensure that the offer is accepted, but in the dictator game there are no strategic concerns 
because Player B cannot reject any allocation. The game-theoretic prediction is for Player A to 
keep everything; nevertheless, in independent replicated experiments dictators consistently give 
non-zero amounts (for a summary, see Camerer 2003). The distribution of offers is highly 
sensitive to the experimental context, which is one reason experimentalists continue to conduct 
further dictator-game experiments (for a discussion, see Smith 2008).  
 Forsythe et al. (1994; hereafter FHSS) conduct the first dictator game with monetary 
rewards and compare their results to the ultimatum game to try to understand dictator 
motivations as a taste for fairness. Hoffman et al. (1994; hereafter HMSS) and Schurter and 
Wilson (2009) explore this concept further by assigning roles based on scores on a general 
knowledge quiz. Allowing a participant to earn the right to be a dictator decreases offers 
compared to offers in the baseline treatments, but does not reduce them all to (near) zero. 
Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996; hereafter HMS) use the degree of anonymity as a treatment 
and find that procedures that increase anonymity decrease mean offers made by dictators. 
Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) combine these treatments and add a high-stakes version. 
With anonymity, earned wealth, and high stakes, dictators keep everything an astounding 97 
percent of the time. Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) conclude that it matters who earns the stakes: 
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when dictators earn stakes, they offer nothing, but when recipients earn stakes, dictators offer 
significant amounts. Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) redefine the choice set in the dictator game 
to include the option of taking some money from the other person. They independently find that 
this variation reduces offers significantly, and conclude that participant expectations and social 
norms have a significant effect on dictator decisions. Etang, Fielding, and Knowles (2011) find 
that Cameroonian villagers send more money to players who are from the same village as the 
dictator. Hergueux and Jacquemet (2015) find that dictators participating on the Internet, where 
social distance seems large, send more to the dictatee compared to dictators in a laboratory room. 
In each of these experiments, strategic structure is typically modeled in the same way—as a 
dictator game—but the distribution of offers varies significantly. 
 One common aim of dictator-game experiments is to identify  the conditions that 
“produce rational behavior”—that is, to design treatments and procedures such that subjects 
adhere to standard game-theoretic predictions (Cherry, Frykblom, and Jacquemet 2002, p. 1218). 
These experiments isolate subjects, emphasize the fact that the game is a one-shot situation, and 
make their decisions doubly anonymous. One notable exception is Frey and Bohnet (1995), who 
take students from their own principles-of-microeconomics class and conduct treatments where 
participants can identify one another or communicate with one another. They find that 
identification brings the mean offer to half the endowment. Since this experiment was conducted 
within a classroom setting, the students have the reasonable expectation of interacting in the 
future, which their findings bear out. In another experiment, Eckel and Grossman (1996) use 
doubly anonymous procedures with two recipients and find that players give more to the 
American Red Cross than to an anonymous Player B. Finally, as evidence of just how socially 
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sensitive dictators are, even with doubly anonymous procedures, Rigdon et al. (2009) find that 
the weak social cue of three dots in the form of “watching eyes” increases dictator offers.  
 HMS describe their treatments as manipulations of the social distance between the 
participants in the dictator game and the experimenter. Their dictator decisions are designed to 
be completely anonymous in an attempt to maximize the social distance between the dictator and 
the rest of the world. In this experiment, we attempt the opposite, to decrease the social distance 
between random strangers as well as the experimenter and the world on the Internet relative to a 
typical experiment conducted in a laboratory. We take the dictator game outside the laboratory 
and record subjects’ decisions on video with permission to post the video on the Internet. To 
what degree do people going about their daily lives express other-regarding behavior in the 
dictator game? In addition, we analyze factors influencing a potential subject’s decision to either 
participate or not participate in our experiment.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II provides an overview of 
our experimental design, procedures, and hypotheses, section III reports our results, and section 
IV concludes with a discussion. 
 
II. Experimental Design, Procedures, and Hypotheses 
 Traditionally, the dictator game is conducted in a laboratory among anonymous subjects 
recruited from the undergraduate population at a university. Participants are separated before the 
experiment begins and paid for their time. Instructions are designed to remove as much context 
as possible from the decision and not activate what HMS refer to as the “unconscious, 
preprogrammed rules of social exchange behavior” (p. 659).  
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 We created three treatments to vary the level of social distance between participants and 
observers in this experiment, starting at a level that is already acutely lower than in the typical 
laboratory experiment. We recruited the dictators for our experiment from people walking with 
friends in a shopping mall. In the No Video treatment, the dictator is taken aside and given the 
experimental task of allocating money to a stranger viewable from approximately forty feet 
away. In the Video treatment, an experimenter explains to the participant that his or her decision 
will be recorded and then positions the dictator in front of a running video camera before giving 
the instructions on the decision task. In the Monitor treatment, the experimenter explains to the 
participant and his or her companions that the participant’s decision will be recorded and 
simultaneously displayed live on an LCD monitor at the research desk, where others can observe 
the experiment, and importantly, where those personally known to the dictator can watch them 
make the decision. These treatments glaringly reduce the social distance between the participant 
and the experimenter, his or her peers, and anyone who might someday see the video recordings.  
As a baseline, the No Video treatment decreases social distance between the dictator and 
his or her peers, the dictatee, and the experimenters since anonymity is not provided. The Video 
treatment further decreases social distance between the dictator and anyone who might watch the 
video. The Monitor treatment even further reduces social distance between the dictator and both 
his or her peers and the experimenters. We conduct an “artefactual field experiment” (Harrison 
and List 2004). 
 
Procedures 
 We conducted this experiment over two days at a high-traffic center of an indoor 
shopping mall in California. Two of the authors, hearafter called recruiters RA(female) and 
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RB(male), recruited shoppers as they walked through the mall based on the following criteria: 
the shoppers had to be in a group of at least two and multiple members of the group had to 
appear to be at least eighteen years of age. The recruiters greeted the shoppers with the following 
pitch: “Hello, I’m part of a research team at <insert university>. If you can spare five minutes to 
participate in our study, we’ll pay you $5 for your time.” In most cases, shoppers stated they did 
not have enough time and chose not to participate. Frey and Bohnet (1995) report that over 95 
percent of students participated in the dictator game when it was conducted in their classroom; 
most shoppers were not as willing, even with an offer of payment. Only 76 out of the 431 
shoppers approached (17.6 percent) participated in our study. If shoppers asked questions about 
the nature of the study, the recruiters emphasized that the study would be short, that it entailed no 
risks, and that shoppers would be paid for their time, but gave no further details about the 
experiment itself.  
 Once a shopper agreed to participate, the recruiter led him or her to a table where one of 
two managers randomly assigned them to a treatment by the roll of a die. The treatment 
determined the necessary paperwork for subject consent and permissions. For the Video and 
Monitor treatments, the participant had to sign a consent form in order to be recorded, and all 
participants, regardless of treatment, were also required to sign a consent form to participate as 
well as a third form acknowledging the $5 payment.1 After the forms were completed and the 
participant had been paid, instructor IA(male) or IB(male) led the participant away from the table 
and the experiment began. At this point, participants still had no knowledge of the decision task. 
See figure 1 for a diagram of the experiment. 
While the paperwork was being handled at the desk, a third recruiter RC recruited 
another shopper to participate as Player B. He approached shoppers and gave the following 
                                                          
1 Two shoppers declined to participate after reading over the consent forms.   
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pitch: “Hello sir (ma’am). I’m part of a research team at <insert university>. I would like to 
invite you to participate in a research study we are conducting in the mall. All you need to do is 
stand here with me for about a minute, and you will have the chance to make money. Would you 
like to?”  RC approached shoppers who appeared to be over eighteen years of age and did not 
appear to have any connection with the potential dictator.  
After the subjects completed the paperwork and RC recruited another participant, the 
experiment began. Instructor IA or IB read the following instructions, consistent across all three 
treatments: “My colleague <RC name> has recruited another person to participate in this study.”2 
Here the instructor paused and pointed to RC, who acknowledged the participant with a wave. “I 
have $20.” At this point, the instructor displayed $20 cash in $1 bills. “How much of this $20 
would you like me to take to that person over there? The rest is yours to keep.” We designed the 
instructions to be as concise as possible. Short instructions minimize the time cost to participants 
and ensure the instructions are delivered in a consistent, neutral way by IA and IB. 
At this point, most participants paused to process the question, and many asked for 
clarification. Once the subject made a decision, it was repeated to them for confirmation. The 
instructor then paid the subject and walked the remaining cash over to RC and the dictatee 
participant. The trial concluded with the other participant being paid and signing the payment-
acknowledgement form.  
 To administer the No Video treatment, IA or IB led the participant away from the 
research table. Subjects were taken away from the video camera so there was no confusion 
regarding the possibility of being recorded. For the Video treatment, subjects were led in front of 
the video camera before any instructions were given. Before the instructor led the participants 
away for the Monitor treatment, a manager informed the participant and anyone with them that 
                                                          
2 IA and IB read the instructions from a clipboard to ensure consistent use of neutral language. 
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the video of the experiment would be shown on the LCD monitor, and invited those not 
participating to stay and watch.  
 The managers recorded data on all shoppers who were asked to participate over two days. 
When a shopper was approached, a manager recorded who had delivered the pitch, the size of the 
group, the gender of the person who responded, and whether the individual agreed to participate. 
If they agreed, a manager recorded who delivered the instructions and their final decision. For 
the Video and Monitor treatments, they also recorded the gender of the recipient.    
 
Hypotheses 
  By conducting the dictator game in a public setting among strangers, we are limiting the 
degree to which certain strategic concerns, including reciprocity from the dictatee and the 
experimenter, will motivate offers. This aspect of the procedures tends to push offers toward zero 
in the laboratory. However, by recording the decisions on video, participants lose a significant 
degree of anonymity. The consent form grants permission to display the videos in a public 
setting, making the decisions explicitly not anonymous. Further, by changing the setting from the 
laboratory to a shopping mall, we are changing participant expectations. Undergraduates come to 
the laboratory expecting to earn money, but shoppers do not go to the mall expecting to be paid. 
These factors, we hypothesize, would tend to encourage dictators to give away some portion of 
the endowment. 
 We utilize the No Video treatment as our baseline and compare the results to FHSS, the 
first dictator game to use monetary rewards, because their results have been successfully 
replicated by HMS. The social distance between the participants in this setting is comparatively 
smaller than the social distance in a laboratory experiment, where subjects remain in separate 
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rooms and do not directly make the decision in the physical presence of the experimenter. Thus, 
we hypothesize that this will lead to higher offers than in the typical dictator-game experiment.  
 Because the social distance between subjects and the rest of the world decreases 
dramatically in the Video treatment, we expect higher offers in this treatment than in the No 
Video treatment. The Video consent form does not state explicitly what the video will be used 
for, but only that it could involve “any communications medium currently existing or later 
created, including without limitation print media, television, and the Internet.” This uncertainty, 
combined with the social distance with respect to the dictatee, which is the same as it is in the No 
Video treatment, will, we predict, lead subjects to offer more on average to their stranger 
counterpart.  
 Finally, we expect the Monitor treatment will increase offers compared to both 
treatments. In the other treatments and the typical laboratory experiment, participants can choose 
to hide their decision from their peers, but in the Monitor treatment that possibility is removed. 
Because of the immediate feedback that subjects will likely receive from their peers, we 
hypothesize that participants will offer more in this treatment than in the No Video and Video 
treatments. In sum, this treatment further reduces the social distance between the subject and his 
or her immediate peer group, maintains relative to the Video treatment the same social distance 
between the subject and anyone who might see the recording, and maintains relative to the No 
Video treatment the same social distance between the subject and their counterpart participant. 
 In all treatments, we expect that the decreased social distance will make participants more 
socially conscious of their decisions. Specifically, we expect that when people choose to make 
low offers, or offers of zero, they will provide us with some justification. Although our 
instructions do not prompt subjects to justify their decision, the dictator question is a peculiar 
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one, after which the trial abruptly ends. We expect that some subjects will volunteer to explain 
why they chose to make their offer.  
 
III. Results  
 We collected data on 22, 28, and 23 dictators in the No Video, Video, and Monitor 
treatments, respectively.3 Given the prior sensitivity of the results to the procedures in 
conducting dictator games, we recorded additional details not normally reported in the dictator-
game research, including which researcher recruited the subject and which researcher asked the 
dictator to make a decision. We also collected general information on the people who declined to 
participate in the study, and we transcribed what the participants on video said during the 
experiment. As an overview of the results, figure 2 reports the frequency distribution of the 
offers by treatment and broken down by who recruited the subject. 
We begin by comparing our treatments against the FHSS and HMS baseline. Table 1 
reports one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum and (two-sided) Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the 
percentage of the total pie offered in our treatments with those offered in FHSS and HMS.  
All treatments were significantly different from the FHSS+HMS baseline, though the 
Video treatment is marginally so with the Wilcoxon test (p-value = 0.0582). This supports our 
more general hypothesis that the amount given increases as the social distance decreases between 
the dictator and the dictatee and between the dictator and the experimenter and between the 
dictator and the general public (in the Video treatment). 
 Jointly comparing our three treatments, a Kruskal-Wallis test indicates marginal support 
with an unordered alternative (KW = 5.41, p-value = 0.0668), but a Jonckheere test for ordered 
                                                          
3 We omit three observations in the Monitor treatment for which the dictatee left before the dictator had made a final 
decision. Incidentally, the three offers are $0, $5, and $10. 
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alternatives is highly insignificant (J22,28,23 = –0.15, p-value = 0.5625). We investigate this 
further with one-sided pairwise Wilcoxon rank sum tests, the results for which we report in table 
2. 
 One part of our ordered hypothesis is borne out. Subjects in the Monitor treatment give 
significantly more money away than subjects in the Video treatment. The average offers in the 
Monitor and Video treatments are $11.78 and $8.14, respectively. There is no statistically 
significant difference between the Video and the No Video treatment. The average offer in the No 
Video treatment is $12.27, which is greater than the average in the other treatments. Ex post, we 
identified another difference between the No Video and the Video and Monitor treatments: the 
extra consent form for photographic consent and release. Perhaps there is an unanticipated and 
implicit exchange at play here. Subjects who fill out an extra page of a consent form for the 
Video treatment may feel more entitled to keep money in exchange for the release of their image 
into the public domain. The Monitor treatment nearly fully offsets that difference between the No 
Video and Video treatments. 
It is plausible that the social-distance phenomenon is still operating here, ceteris paribus, 
but the camera is adding an additional effect not explained by social distance. To explore this 
more fully by controlling for other variables, we estimate a Tobit model of the offers with both 
upper- and lower-tail censoring. Table 3 summarizes the model and reports its estimates. 
Marginal effects are reported in table 4. 
Consistent with the nonparametric statistics above, the Video treatment decreases the 
amount that dictators offer, and thus we fail to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative that video recording increases the amount that dictators give. The estimated marginal 
effect is -$3.93. Most of this decrease is offset when the monitor is added to the video recording 
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procedures (p-value = 0.0241). The marginal effect of including a monitor for the subject’s group 
members to watch is $3.67. 
The sex of the dictator and the day the subject participated in the experiment are both 
insignificant (p-values = 0.5461 and 0.1008, respectively). One indication of just how sensitive 
this experiment is to the procedures is that the recruiter had a significant impact on the offer that 
the dictator made (p-value = 0.0002). Being recruited by the female recruiter (RA) reduced the 
amount offered by the dictator by a nontrivial $6.37 (in the Video treatment), despite the fact that 
neither RA nor RB consciously selected for any characteristic. Moreover, it is worth repeating 
that the recruiters are not involved in the decision-making process of the dictator. RA and RB 
merely invite the mall shoppers to participate and then escort the subject to the main table, where 
the managers administered the consent forms for the experiment. (At this point, the subjects still 
have no knowledge of their decision task.) Instructor IA or IB then escorts the subjects to the 
specific spot where the formal experiment is administered. This procedural detail also has a 
significant effect on the offers of the dictator. IA is significant (p-value = 0.0500) and has an 
estimated marginal effect of -$5.45 (in the Video treatment). 
We also collected data on the mall shoppers we solicited to participate in the experiment. 
Using these data, we estimate a probit model to assess what variables, if any, affect the 
probability of a shopper agreeing to participate. This is particularly interesting in light of the 
recruiter effect found above. Are shoppers more or less likely to accept the invitation to 
participate from RA, the recruiter who appears to have the effect of reducing the offers of the 
dictators? The binary left-hand variable equals 1 if the shopper agreed to participate and 0 
otherwise. Table 5 reports the estimates and table 6 the marginal effects. 
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 The only significant variable is Female (p-value = 0.0423). At the average group size of 
2.22, a female mall shopper is 7.6 percentage points less likely to accept the invitation than a 
male respondent. Notably, RA has no significant effect on the probability that a shopper decides 
to participate (p-value = 0.6478), which indicates that RA is not differentially recruiting people 
for the experiment relative to RB, even though dictators recruited by RA offer significantly less 
to their counterparts. The insignificant estimate of Day2 indicates that the success rate of the 
recruiters does not change with a day’s worth of experience (p-value = 0.2669)  
 
IV. Discussion and Conclusion  
The video record and the impromptu responses of the dictators while on camera offer a 
look into the subjects’ perception of this task. A sample of the videos can be viewed at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZHN8xyp6Y0. We report all transcribed responses in 
appendix A. Several of the dictators that give nothing justify their decision with the rhetorical 
question “Why should I give him [or her] anything?” Others seek approval from the 
experimenter by asking whether offering nothing is a “good” or “wrong” response. Noticeably, 
no subject who gives $10 or more reports any compunction regarding their decision. If anything, 
they are delighted to give money to the other person. These responses also reveal a wide 
divergence in the perception of the property right over the money. Whereas one dictator who 
gives nothing asks, “Why you gonna give him any money at all? He has to earn it,” another has 
the completely opposite perception: “Seeing as it’s not really my money, you can give all of it to 
her.” Several dictators who send $10 use the word “half” or “fair,” which suggests importing a 
heuristic or rule. One subject who gave half added, “I’m a nice guy.”  
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Finally, many subjects are just plain baffled by the decision task. Many a quizzical look 
accompanies the utterance “That’s it?” when the decision task ends. Or as one woman exclaimed 
as she returned to her husband at the monitor station, “This is bizarre!” The dictator game is 
bizarre for the participants because we, following the convention in conducting such 
experiments, intentionally stripped the decision of a specific social context, and people do not 
normally make interdependent decisions in a contextual vacuum. While people do not regularly 
allocate windfall money to random shoppers in a mall, there’s no reason to assume they would 
not be generous to a stranger in the familiar context of a charity or compete against that stranger 
in a contest. The large symmetric variance in the offers across treatments is perhaps the result of 
the different social contexts that participants in each offer category personally imposed on the 
experiment, which prompted them to behave generously, equitably, or stingily toward a stranger. 
If the dictator game is a simple, straightforward game for the economists who study it, it isn’t so 
clear-cut for the average shopper in a mall. (Watch for the bewildered looks on the faces of the 
participants in the YouTube video.) Social context matters, for if the experimenter does not 
provide one, the participant will. 
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Ha: No Video > FHSS+HMS Video > FHSS+HMS Monitor > FHSS+HMS 
Wilcoxon test W52,22 = 928 W52,28 = 884 W52,23 = 941 
p-value <0.0001 0.0582 <0.0001 
    
Ha: No Video ≠ FHSS+HMS Video ≠ FHSS+HMS Monitor ≠ FHSS+HMS 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test 
D52,22 = 0.5105 D52,28 = 0.3022 D52,23 = 0.5569 
p-value 0.0004 0.0499 0.0001 
 
Table 1. Comparisons with FHSS and HMS offers
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Wn,m (p-value) Video Monitor 
No Video 413 
(0.9798) 
258.5 
(0.5488) 
Video  414.5 
(0.0400) 
 
Table 2. Pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between treatments 
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Variable Description Estimate p-value 
Constant  16.16 <0.0001 
RA 
Subjects recruited by RA = 1; 
subjects recruited by RB = 0. 
-8.81 0.0002 
IA 
Decision administered by IA = 1; 
decision administered by IB = 0. 
-7.33 0.0500 
RA x IA Interaction 1.90 0.8055 
Day2 
Experiment conducted on day 2 = 
1; experiment conducted on day 1 
= 0. 
4.02 0.1008 
Video 
Video and Monitor treatments = 1;  
No Video treatment = 0. 
-5.36 
0.9661† 
 
Monitor 
Monitor treatment =1;  
Video and No Video treatments = 
0. 
4.95 0.0241† 
Female* 
Female dictator = 1;  
male dictator = 0. 
1.24 0.5461 
†One-side test; two-sided otherwise. 
*We did not collect data on the sex of the dictatee in the No Video treatment. 
 Table 3. Tobit model of offers (left censored at 0; right censored at 20) 
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Baseline Additional variable 
evaluated at 1 
Marginal 
effect 
All variables evaluated at 0  
(No Video treatment) 
Video -$3.93 
All variables evaluated at 0  
(No Video treatment) 
Day2 $2.29 
Video = 1; all others evaluated at 0. Monitor $3.67 
Video = 1; all others evaluated at 0. RA -$6.37 
Video = 1; all others evaluated at 0. IA -$5.45 
Table 4. Estimated marginal effects for Tobit model 
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Variable Description Estimate p-value 
Constant  -1.11       0.0004 
Female 
Sex of the person in the group of 
shoppers who was recruited. 
-0.29       0.0423      
GroupSize 
Total number of people in the group of 
the person who was recruited (minimum 
= 2). 
0.13       0.2976     
RA 
Subject recruited by RA = 1; subject 
recruited by RB = 0. 
-0.07       0.6478      
Day2 
Experiment conducted on day 2 = 1; 
experiment conducted on day 1 = 0. 
0.17       0.2669      
   N = 431 
Table 5. Probit model of shopper agreeing to participate in the experiment 
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Baseline Additional variable 
evaluated at 1 
Marginal 
effect 
GroupSize = 2.22 (mean), all 
other variables equal 0. 
Female -0.076 
GroupSize = 2.22 (mean), all 
other variables equal 0. 
RA -0.017 
GroupSize = 2.22 (mean), all 
other variables equal 0. 
Day2 0.043 
   
 Non-dichotomous variable  
GroupSize = 2.22 (mean), all 
other variables equal 0. 
GroupSize  0.032 
 
Table 6. Estimated marginal effects for probit model 
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Figure 1. Experiment diagram 
 
 The dictator moves through three stations in the Monitor treatment as indicated by the 
circled numbers. First, the dictator is recruited by researcher RA. Second, the dictator completes 
paperwork and leaves his or her companions at the table with managers MA and MB. Third, the 
dictator performs the decision task with the receiver, Player B, indicated by the cross, in view 
about 40 feet away. Player B was recruited from passing shoppers by RC. Instructions for the 
decision task are given by instructor IA and the payment to Player B, if any, is delivered by IA.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of offers 
 
Some dictators gifted the entire amount and the modal outcome was a 50/50 split. 
Dictators recruited by recruiter RB were more generous on average.  
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Appendix A 
 
For a look into the subjects’ perceptions of this task, we report here a transcription 
of the impromptu responses of the dictators while on camera, broken down by how much 
they offer to the other person. The left two columns contain the dictator responses for 
offers less than $10, the middle two columns for offers of $9 and $10, and the right two 
columns for offers greater than $10.  
 
Comment Offer  Comment Offer  Comment Offer 
“Why you gonna give him 
any money at all? He has 
to earn it. Zero.” 
“That's the game? So I get 
this money just for that?” 
0  
“How much of that?”  
“That much [points 
out random amount].” 
9  
“[looks around 
confused] umm… 
about 13 for 
them.” 
13 
“Zero. [laughs]” 
“Is that a good answer?  
Yeah.” 
0  
“Umm… 10? Split it 
in half?” 10  
“That person over 
there? I'd say 15.” 15 
“I'll take it all.  Why do I 
give her any?”  
“All right. Here you go.”  
“That's all? Are you 
serious? [laughs]” 
0  
“Half.”  
“Yeah. That's it?” 10  
“How much? 15? 
[shrugs] OK, 
thank you.” 
15 
“Why would I send any of 
it?”   
“Nothing. Send her 
nothing!”  
“That's it?” 
0  
“[shrugs] Umm…I 
would say half and 
half.  Sounds fair 
enough.”  
10  
“How much of 
that 20 you should 
take over there 
and the rest is 
mine? How about 
8, 8? No, give him 
15; the rest is 
fine.” 
15 
“Give it to me.”  
“Yes.” 
 
0  
“The person in the 
purple? Uh I'll split it 
with her.  Give her 
10.” 
 
10  “Really? 15.” 15 
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“Do I have to, like, say the 
reasons?”  
“I wouldn't want them to 
take any of it.  I'll take 20.” 
0  
“Uh… [shakes head] 
10.” 10  
“[shrugs] 20 
bucks.”  
“20. That's it?” 
20 
“Why?”  
“And why should I give to 
him $20? [shakes her 
head].”  
[laughs, consults mother 
and father] “OK, nothing.” 
0  
“I don't know.  
Whatever.  $10.” 10  
“How much of the 
$20 you should 
take over to that 
person? I don't 
know; the whole 
20.  I don't care.” 
20 
“I'll just take it all.” 0  
“How much do you 
have there?  You have 
$20 there and you're 
wondering how much 
I think you should 
give to him, and how 
much you should give 
to me? 10 to him, 10 
to me.”  
“Might be a little 
tricky.  There's 10 
here.  So I give this to 
you? [to camera 
man].” 
10  
“[shrugs] All of 
it?” 
“All of it.” 
20 
“$1.”  
“Is that wrong? [starts to 
follow] Is that it?” 
1  
“Umm, half of it?”   
“That's it?” 10  
“You can give it 
to them if you 
want.” 
“Yeah, sure.” 
20 
“What do you mean?”  
“One.  That it?” 1  
“Which one?”  
“Oh, the lady on the 
square.  How much, 
20? Ones? We gonna 
go to a strip club with 
that afterwards?  
Half—give her half.” 
10  
“It's up to you. It's 
not my money.”  
“It's my money?”  
“[laughs] That's 
pretty funny.  
Seeing as it's not 
really my money 
you can give all of 
it to her.” 
20 
“So you're just gonna take 
it to your colleague and 
give it to that guy? Give 
him $1.” 
1  
“10 and 10.  I think 
that's fair.” 10  
“Umm… Give her 
all of it, I guess.” 20 
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“Of the $20?  Umm, a 
dollar?”  
“Oh, no, giving them the 
dollar.” 
1  
“Half [shrugs].  That's 
it? You're gonna give 
that to him?” 
10  
“OK.  Which 
one?”  
“The white shirt? 
Give him all of 
it.” 
20 
“$3”  
“Yeah.” 3  
“5 bucks the same 
thing”  
“Oh for myself? I'll 
give him the even 
amount I have.”  
“Yeah: 10 and 10.” 
10  
“Umm.. All of it?”  
“Yeah, thanks.” 20 
“Half. Actually I'll take 15; 
he'll take 5.” 5  
“10?”  
“Yeah.” 10  
“Give it to them.”  
“Yeah! [jumps up 
and down over to 
friends] I just gave 
that guy money!” 
20 
“5?”  
“Yeah.” 5  
“What person?”  
“Well, he looks kind 
of hungry so I'll say 10 
bucks each?”  
“Yeah.  That's it?” 
10  
“To give to her?”  
“Well, give her 20 
’cause I've already 
got a 5.” 
20 
   
“How much should 
you take over to her?”  
“Half?” 
10  
“All of it 
[shrugs]” 20 
   
“Why do I have to 
give him money?”  
“I don't know? 10 
bucks?”  
“Really?” 
10    
   
“Half, half of 
whatever's there.  I'm a 
nice guy.  That's it? 
Really?” 
10    
   “Umm… Half?” 10    
   “I'll give 'em 10.” 10    
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Appendix B 
 
Experimental instructions  
 
Pitch for dictator: 
 
Excuse me. I’m part of a research team at Chapman University. We’ve randomly selected you to 
participate in our study. It will take less than five minutes and we’ll give you $5 for your time. 
Are you interested? 
 
Instructions for dictator: 
<RC name> has randomly selected another person over there. How much of this $20 should we 
take to the person with <RC name>? The rest is yours. 
 
Pitch for dictatee 
Excuse me. I’m part of a research team at Chapman University. We’ve randomly selected you to 
participate in our study. All you have to do is stand here with me for a minute or two and you 
may receive cash. Are you interested? 
 
Instructions for dictatee: 
Just stand here with me and one of my colleagues will be over in just a minute.  
 
